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STUDENT
ARTICLES
Wireless Communications and the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996: An Experiment in
Federalism
Lynn Hanley
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, zoning and land use issues have been entrusted to
local governments to authorize and regulate, as they deemed appropri-
ate. However, when Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("TCA") it had a direct impact on local zoning control. Designed
to implement a national public policy to encourage deregulation and
innovation in the telecommunications industry, the act prohibits local
communities from banning antennas or towers for wireless, cellular
telecommunications. However, the TCA is not a complete preemption
of local zoning authority; the act does allow local governments to
regulate the siting of such towers within specific limitations outlined
by Congress.
This "experiment in federalism" 2 has had a significant impact
on consumers. Wireless customers have reached nearly 70 million,
resulting in the proliferation of antennas in communities across the
country. The TCA has successfully increased competition producing
economic growth for the country, lower prices, increased innovation
and better technology, all benefits to the consumer. But at what cost?
Because of this competition, the number of services has increased, the
number of customers has increased and, because companies are reluc-
tant to share space on these towers, the number of towers has in-
creased.
This Note will discuss the purpose of the TCA and its ultimate
effect on consumers. To begin, Part II provides an overview of the TCA
and an introduction to the technology behind wireless communication,
including a brief description of the difference between analog and
digital cellular technology. Also relevant to the discussion is the com-
position of the industry and the competition, now a critical component
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of the industry. Additionally, this Note will explain the limitations
outlined in the TCA on local governments and their efforts to restrict
the siting of cellular towers.
Part III then discusses relevant case law and the impact of these
federal court decisions on cellular consumers. The language of the
TCA is vague, and the courts have disagreed on how broadly the act's
limitations should impact local zoning authority. This disagreement
ultimately affects consumers. Part IV analyzes the TCA and the courts'
decisions. Also discussed is what is to be expected for the future,
specifically balancing the purpose of the act with community con-
cerns, and advocating cooperation between the service providers and
local governments in an effort to maximize the benefit to consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Wireless Communications Industry
1. The Technology
In order to analyze the competition within the industry and
ultimately the increasing need for antennas and towers, it is necessary
to understand the technology that encompasses the wireless telecom-
munications industry. Fundamentally, there are two major, competing
branches of wireless communication - cellular and personal communi-
cation services ("PCS").3 Additionally, within cellular there are two
types of technology - analog and digital.4 Although PCS technology
offers some advantages to consumers, the infrastructure for cellular
technology is well established and, with the addition of digital service,
it still adequately services the needs of its consumers.
Cellular technology is based on the transmission of communi-
cations via radio waves. On the transmitting end, the information (or
voice signal) is imposed on a locally generated radio frequency. On the
other end, the receiving end, an antenna receives the signal and feeds
it into a receiver. Whereas radio stations broadcast high-power, one-
way radio transmissions, cellular communications are point-to-point,
low power, two-way radio transmissions. This technology existed as
early as 1947, but cellular systems were not available to the public
until 1982.6
Wireless customers communicate with other wireless customers
through a network of antennas and base stations spread around the
area that receive and transmit these low power radio frequencies. 7
Using an 800-megahertz range, a cellular tower picks up a call and
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transfers it via microwave or landline to the cellular network.8 As the
cellular customer moves out of range, the signal is transferred from
one tower to the next.
In the cellular industry, each tower has a range of less than ten
miles, depending on topography and density.9 Likewise, as the number
of cellular subscribers increase and the areas of travel expand, more
towers are needed to transmit the increasing volume of signals. 10
Consequently, because the radio frequency spectrum has only limited
availability, cellular service requires a technique called frequency
reuse, which is the foundation of the cellular concept." Frequency
reuse utilizes radio frequencies over and over again within the cellular
network, thereby maximizing the use of the available frequency
range. 12
The configuration of cell sites within the network determines
the degree of frequency reuse and, ultimately, the area's service capac-
ity. A formation similar to a honeycomb of adjacent hexagonal cells is a
model network configuration. 3 This structure provides maximum
frequency reuse capacity and seamless service because the cells are
arranged side-by-side.
This concept is applied for both analog cellular communication
as well as digital cellular communications. The analog system operates
with a different type of signal than the digital systems. Specifically, in
an analog system, the signals, or voice messages are "electronically
replicate[d] and amplifliedI as they are carried from the transmitting
antenna to the receiving antenna." 14 However, because of this amplifi-
cation process, outside noise is also picked up and this reduces the
quality of the transmission. Digital cellular communication has since
improved upon the analog systems. In a digital transmission, "a voice
message is converted into binary digits that represent sound intensities
at specific points in time." 5 Consequently, because digital systems are
more immune to noise, they produce clearer transmissions. Addition-
ally, digital signals can be easily manipulated or processed in useful
ways using modem computer processes.
The next evolution in wireless communications is PCS. PCS
operates on two different frequency bands, narrowband PCS and
broadband PCS. Whereas narrowband PCS is used for messaging and
two-way paging services, broadband PCS offers services similar to
cellular communications services. 6 Yet, there are crucial differences
between the two technologies. For example, PCS uses a higher fre-
quency radio wave, around 1800-megahertz. 17 PCS also relies entirely
on digital technology. With the higher frequency and digital technol-
ogy, PCS services "yield greater calling capacities than analog net-
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works." 18 However, because PCS uses a higher frequency than cellular
service, PCS cells are smaller in size and, as a result, greater in number
than cellular cells.19 This ultimately requires more antennas.
2. The Competition
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has the
exclusive responsibility and authority to assign and distribute sections
of the radio frequency spectrum and otherwise regulate the use of the
spectrum. Specifically, the FCC is responsible for dividing the radio
frequency spectrum into sections with diverse uses, including wireless
communications. Likewise, the FCC is responsible for auctioning
licenses that entitle the wireless service providers to employ these
sections of the spectrum.20 Beginning in 1974, the FCC auctioned off
licenses on the 800-megahertz band for cellular communications. 21
Since then, the FCC has also allocated 120-megahertz of spectrum to
broadband PCS and currently, all available licenses for broadband PCS
have been auctioned off.22 Also significant is that the FCC has placed a
spectrum cap in this band; this means that the FCC has limited the
amount of spectrum that one entity can control.23
So far, this arrangement has been successful in creating a flurry
of competition. Under the analog cellular system, each service area had
two wireless service providers.24 But with the introduction of PCS
service, many metropolitan areas have several different wireless pro-
viders.2 The initial PCS auction "attracted real heavyweights: AT&T
Wireless Services; PCS Primeco, a consortium formed by Bell Atlantic,
Nynex, US West, and AirTouch, a wireless provider; and the biggest
bidder of all, an alliance between Sprint and cable TV companies, Cox,
Comcast, and TCI, dubbed the Sprint Telecommunications Venture." 26
Altogether these companies paid almost $8 billion for their licenses in
the initial offering by the FCC.27 Yet, that figure does not include the
expense of building the network of cell towers and antennas to provide
the technology for each of these services.
B. Overview of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The placement of antennas is controlled through zoning regula-
tions. Zoning is the primary means of land use control used by local
governments. The early developments of zoning arose largely from
conflicts between industries and rapidly growing cities. Residents and
business owners looked to their local governments to protect their
health, safety and aesthetics. With the increase in the use of cellular
Loyola Consumer Law ReviewVolume 12, Number 1 1999
technology, the controversy surrounding the siting of wireless commu-
nication towers in their neighborhoods has plagued homeowners.
Consequently, again, homeowners have turned to their local govern-
ment for protection. However, the TCA limits the authority of local
government regulation over the siting of cellular towers.
The TCA states, "[the regulation of the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any state or
local government or instrumentality thereof shall not prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services." 28
This prohibition clause essentially forces local governments into taking
proactive measures in siting these cell towers.
1. Local Zoning Authority Prior to 1996
To understand the TCA's current impact on local zoning author-
ity, some background on the development of this authority is neces-
sary. Fundamentally, the purpose of a zoning ordinance is to protect
and further the public health, safety and welfare, and its lawful exer-
cise may not exceed this. The power to enact a zoning ordinance is
granted by each state to its municipalities and is often referred to as
"police power."
As early as 1926, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.29 that it would presume the legisla-
tive enactment of a zoning ordinance for the Village of Euclid valid
and held that zoning was a constitutional exercise of police power. This
presumption is rebuttable and the court can find the ordinance invalid
if "the provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare."3 ° Just a few years later, the Court made clear in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge31 that, although a zoning ordinance may be valid on its
face, a particular regulation applied to a specific parcel of land may,
nevertheless, be invalid. Subsequently, common law has left the state
courts to decide the constitutional extent to which zoning ordinances
may restrict land uses. Additionally, the federal communications law at
the time, the Communications Act of 1934,32 did not give state or local
governments any direction; many states developed their own telecom-
munications statutes to address the growing concern of antenna and
tower siting.33
Yet, with each state creating its own standards for zoning laws
and land use regulations, problems arose as wireless companies ex-
panded from state to state. For example, in Cellular Tel. Co. v.
Rosenberg,34 the New York Court of Appeals determined that cellular
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telephone companies met the definition of a public utility and, as a
result, should receive preferential treatment.3 5 That is, when cellular
service providers applied for a variance in a zoning ordinance, they
should have received the same lower standard of review that public
utilities receive. 36 However, in Illinois, cellular service providers are not
deemed a public utility. In Illinois RCA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria,37
the district court relied on Illinois statutes and ruled that, "the Public
Utilities Act seems to exclude the telecommunications business."
38
Another divergence among states are the environmental regula-
tions regarding the output of electromagnetic fields ("EMFs") or the
effects of radio frequency ("RF") emissions from transmitters. Fearing
that EMFs or RFs caused cancer, some jurisdictions enacted legislation
to establish EMF and RF emission standards. 39 Still another concern
among homeowners is the aesthetics of cell towers in their neighbor-
hood. Consequently, local zoning authorities created zoning restric-
tions on cell towers so that they would not interfere with the area's
comprehensive master plan.40 Residents also feared that the towers
would create nuisances such as dust, noise, or increased traffic that
would affect their enjoyment of the property.41 Again, as a result of
such public outcry, local governments passed zoning restrictions, even
moratoriums, on the siting of cell towers.
2. Congress Passed the Telecommunications Act
In an effort to confront the rapidly evolving telecommunications
industry, including changes in radio, television, cable, telephone, the
Internet and wireless technology, Congress decided to update the
Communications Act of 1934 and enacted the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.42 The TCA was an "attempt to 'eliminat[e] barriers that inhibit
or preclude the entry of new competitors into various industry sec-
tors,' while at the same time deregulate the radio, television, cable,
telephone industries." 3
Within the TCA, Congress specifically addressed the issue of
uniformity on cell tower siting and the rapid growth of the wireless
communications industry.' The TCA mandated the FCC to address
the RF concerns within 180 days after the TCA's enactment; Congress
also instituted uniform regulations of the development of cellular
communication facilities.45 It is this attempt at uniformity that has
preempted local governments' zoning authority and limits local zon-
ing regulations on cell tower siting.
The theory is that the wireless service providers need the towers
and antennas to maintain their network, and the providers need a
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comprehensive network to compete with other service providers.
Thus, Congress passed the TCA to allow the wireless service providers
to erect their towers and build their networks in order to facilitate
competition.46 Ideally, in turn, this competition would ultimately
benefit the consumers. As William E. Kennard, Chairman of the FCC
explained, "when figuring out what sort of telecommunications frame-
work to establish for our country as it entered the 21st century, Con-
gress wisely reached back to a value as old as America itself: choice.
The idea that once given an array of options, individuals can best
decide what is best for them. Thus, Congress gave the FCC the tools to
break open the monopoly markets to competition. 47
Yet, the TCA does not give wireless service providers the right
to erect towers wherever they choose. Local governments do retain
some zoning authority. Specifically, the TCA states, "[niothing in this
Act shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, con-
struction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities." 48
The TCA does not explicitly prohibit local governments from
creating regulations on the placement cell tower facilities. It does,
however, establish certain limitations that local governments must
observe. For example, the TCA does prohibit a local government from
denying a wireless service provider from erecting a cell tower based on
RF emissions if the provider has complied with the FCC's RF regula-
tions.49
Additionally, the TCA states that local and state regulations
"shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally
equivalent services;"50 nor shall the local or state regulations "prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the provisions of personal wireless
services."'" The TCA also mandates that, "a] state or local government
or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to
place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a
reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed...,,52 Moreover,
any decision by a state or local government to deny a wireless service
provider's request to "place, construct, or modify a personal wireless
facility" must be made in writing and, "supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record. 53
Finally, the TCA permits any person or entity who may be
"adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a state or
local government.. .that is inconsistent with this [act]," to bring suit
against that government within thirty days of the government's action
or inaction.54 Consequently, the local government's zoning authority is
now subject of judicial oversight and thus, the basis for conflict be-
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tween local governments and their constituents on the one hand, and
the wireless service providers and consumers on the other.
III. Judicial Interpretation of the TCA: Rigorous v. Deferential
The TCA has created a great deal of litigation between local
governments and wireless communications providers. Federal district
courts have decided scores of cases across the country. Likewise, appel-
late courts in several circuits have had to address the issue as well.
What has evolved is a clash on how to interpret the TCA. On one hand,
several courts have approached these cases with a "rigorous review of
local zoning decisions;" whereas, other courts have granted "substan-
tial deference to such decisions." 55
In each case, the court must examine the municipality's zoning
code and the actions of the zoning board or any other decision-making
entity, to determine what effect they have on a wireless communication
provider's service. Thus, in light of the TCA, the courts must deter-
mine whether the zoning code has a discriminatory effect and whether
this discrimination is reasonable. A court must also determine whether
the decision by the zoning board was supported with substantial
evidence. And, finally, a court must decide what relief should be
granted, if any. However, each of these decisions requires careful
reading and interpretation of the TCA and as a result, some courts
have disagreed.
A. Discrimination
Section 332(c)(7)(b)(i)(II) forbids local governments from creat-
ing any regulation that would "unreasonably discriminate" among
service providers.56 The Fourth Circuit, in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v.
Virginia Beach, 7 has read this provision to mean that local governments
cannot enact regulations that have the effect of creating a "general" or
"blanket" ban on siting cell towers.58 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that the TCA's discrimination ban did not apply to decisions made on
individual, case-by-case requests for cell towers.5 9 The court ruled that
case-by-case determinations of cell towers siting did not violate the
TCA, and moreover, such an interpretation of the TCA would abolish
local zoning authority.6° Thus, the Fourth Circuit has approached the
TCA with deferential-review by deferring to the local zoning board's
authority.61
The First Circuit in Amherst v. Omninpoint Communications,62 also
applied deferential review but with a different rationale. The court
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reasoned that individual denials could, because of either language or
circumstances, sanction an effective prohibition on personal wireless
service.63 Furthermore, the court proposed a scenario where a zoning
board denies an individual permit request, and in the denial proclaims
that the town will never permit such cell towers or establishes criteria
for the cell towers that providers could never meet.64 The First Circuit
explained that "[tihe fact that the ban is embodied in an individual
decision does not immunize it." 65
The First Circuit further reasoned that "[i]f the criteria or their
administration effectively preclude towers no matter what the carrier
does, they may amount to a ban 'in effect'," and consequently, the
regulation would be a violation of the TCA's effect provision.66 Based
on the facts in this case, however, the court deferred to the local gov-
ernment. The court found that Omnipoint's proposal was not the only
option to provide wireless service to the area. On the contrary,
Omnipoint conceded that lower towers could possibly be used; thus,
because Omnipoint's proposal was not the only possible proposal, the
town's denial was not a ban on wireless service.67 Thus, the First Cir-
cuit applied a deferential review of the town's zoning requirements by
deferring to the zoning board's determination. However, the First
Circuit's approach was not as extreme as that applied by the Fourth
Circuit.
On the other hand, a district court in Virginia applied the more
rigorous review in Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors. s The
district court ruled that the "scope of § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) is not limited
to general prohibitions, moratoriums, bans, or other similarly ex-
pressed hostile limitations on the siting of personal wireless facili-
ties.'"69 The court explained that even seemingly neutral policies re-
stricting the siting of cell towers might be prohibitive if those policies
have the effect of rejecting all possible sites.70
Similarly, in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth,7' the Second Circuit
ruled that TCA should be applied to individual, case-by-case zoning
decisions and did not apply only to explicit, general bans on personal
wireless service.72 The Second Circuit reasoned that, "[s]ubsection B(ii)
requires local governments to act on an application, and subsection
B(iii) requires a denial to be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Together these sections constitute a clear man-
date to consider applications on a case-by-case basis." 73 The court went
on to explain that reading subsection B(i)(II) strictly as a prohibition on
general bans would make the phrase "or have the effect of prohibiting"
in subsection B(i)(II) redundant.74 The court also explained that such an
interpretation of B(i)(II) "would lead to the untenable result that once
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personal wireless services are available somewhere within the jurisdic-
tion of state or a local government, whether by virtue of a facility
located outside or inside its borders, the state or local government
could deny any further applications with impunity."7 5
B. Substantial Evidence Standard
The Fourth Circuit has also taken the deferential approach in
considering section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 6 In overturning the district court,
the Fourth Circuit explained that the "in writing" requirement and the
"substantial evidence" requirement are distinct and should be treated
separately.77 Comparing the TCA to the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that, "the simple requirement of a 'decision...
in writing' cannot reasonably be inflated into a requirement of a 'state-
ment of... findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis there-
for."' 78 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the city council's stamp
"DENIED" and the date of the decision was sufficient to meet the "in
writing" requirement. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held that the sub-
stantial evidence requirement assumes the federal administrative law
standard as well.
The district court for the northern district of Illinois agreed with
the Fourth Circuit's evaluation of the "in writing" requirement.79 The
Illinois district court ruled that "had Congress intended to impose the
additional burden of producing an opinion-like writing on state and
local entities, it would have said so - if not in the statute, then certainly
in the conference report. 8 0 Thus, the court required only a statement
from the deciding body informing the applicant that the application
had been denied.81
The Fox Lake court, however, did not concur with the Fourth
Circuit's substantial evidence standard. On the contrary, the Illinois
district court ruled that the TCA has changed the rules for zoning
where cell towers are involved.82 Congress has forbidden a zoning
board or city government from denying a permit for a cell tower unless
the denial was supported with substantial evidence. The district court
explained that "Congress explicitly defined substantial evidence as 'the
traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions."' 3
Thus, under this standard, a neighbor or constituent who offers unsup-
ported testimony in opposition to the cell tower is not sufficient. 84
Congress did not intend the siting of cell towers to be overthrown
merely by neighborhood opposition. 5
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Cellular
Telephone Co. v. Oyster Bay.86 The appellate court explained that sub-
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stantial evidence is "less than a preponderance, but more than a scin-
tilla of evidence." 7 Moreover, in determining whether the decision was
based on substantial evidence, the court must determine whether a
reasonable person would find that the evidence presented was compe-
tent to uphold the conclusion.88 In examining the facts of the case, the
court noted that aesthetics could be considered in New York zoning
cases. However, the court also explained that "a few generalized con-
cerns about a potential decrease in property values, especially in light
of AT&T's contradictory expert testimony, does not seem adequate to
support a conclusion. 89
The Third Circuit applied the same reasoning in Omnipoint Corp.
v. Pine Grove.90 Concluding that the zoning board's actions had been
quasi-judicial, the Third Circuit applied the same substantial evidence
standard as applied in the review of an administrative agency.91 Again,
finding that the testimony of area residents was a generalized concern
for aesthetics and property values, the court ruled that such evidence
did not meet the substantial evidence requirement of the TCA in order
to support the zoning board's denial.92 Thus, the Third Circuit held
that courts should not rely on generalities or speculation.93 This is a
more rigorous standard, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's approach, and
ultimately diminishes the local zoning authority.
C. Appropriate Relief
After finding that the zoning board did not have substantial
evidence to support its denial, the Second Circuit in Oyster Bay ruled
that the injunction imposed by the district court was proper.94 The
lower court had granted the wireless provider an injunction and or-
dered the town to issue the special use permit required to locate the
cell tower where the provider had proposed.95 The Second Circuit
recognized that the TCA does not provide specific remedies for viola-
tions of the act; however, it reasoned that an injunction best met the
goals of the TCA and Congress's intent to expedite resolution of these
controversies. 6 The court also noted that the majority of district courts
have found that injunctive relief is appropriate relief for TCA viola-
tions.97
As the Second Circuit points out, however, not all courts have
found that injunctive relief is permissible under the TCA. The district
court in Fox Lake, for example, held that the TCA does not specify that
a writ of mandamus is the appropriate relief.98 Additionally, the district
court ruled that because the issues of substantial evidence and the "in
writing" requirement are still unsettled, mandamus relief is not
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proper.99 Thus, the court remanded the case back to the village officials
to conduct additional hearings. °0
IV. Impact
It is clear, the courts have disagreed on what standard to apply
to zoning regulations. On the one hand, some courts have read the
TCA narrowly, giving more deference to the local zoning authorities.
Yet, on the other hand, a number of courts have applied a rigorous
standard in reviewing TCA violations and have place broad limitations
on local zoning boards thereby diminishing their control. The TCA has
not created complete uniformity as Congress has contemplated, but the
TCA is a step in the right direction.
As the First Circuit stated in Amherst, "we are in the realm of
trade-offs: on one side are the opportunity for the carrier to save costs,
pay more to the town, and reduce the number of towers; on the other
are more costs, more towers, but possibly less offensive sites and
somewhat shorter towers." 101 The First Circuit ruled that Congress had
decided when it enacted the TCA that these decisions were best left for
the local governments to decide. 102 This middle-of-the-road approach
provides the local governments the deference they are accustomed to
in zoning cases, yet applies a rational review of the regulation in light
of Congress's intent to facilitate the growth of wireless communica-
tions.
The First Circuit in Amherst made a critical observation. In
overruling the district court, the First Circuit explained that although
the town had denied Omnipoint's request to locate four cell towers
within town limits, the denial did not constitute a ban of wireless
service.0 3 The First Circuit noted that Omnipoint's requested sites were
not the only locations to put the towers.'0 Furthermore, it was not
certain that the towers needed to be 190 feet.05 And, finally, the court
recognized that providers need to consider alternatives, including co-
locating or sharing tower space. 6
In fact, co-location has already been explored as one possible
solution to the proliferation of antennas. Building a cell tower and
maintaining it costs money. But a service provider can lower its ex-
penses by leasing out space on its towers to other wireless compa-
nies. 107 However, the competition, inherent in the industry, interferes
with sharing tower space 08 Critics of cell towers argue that wireless
service providers don't have enough incentive to share space on cell
towers. 1°9 In Louisville, Kentucky, for example, one provider proposed
to erect a tower across the street form another service provider's
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tower." ° The first tower was the subject of a hot debate four years
earlier, but was settled when the service provider agreed to share space
on the tower with other service providers."'
Thus, because wireless technology requires antennas for its
services, consumers cannot have a wireless communications system
without them. And, consumers certainly want a wireless system. The
FCC reports that as of early this year, 68 million Americans owned a
wireless phone.12 The FCC also anticipates that wireless service pro-
viders will offer wireless computer networking as well as wireless
Internet access." 3 Moreover, PCS service providers intend to offer their
services to "compete directly with residential local exchange and
exchange access services.""' 4 This technological innovation benefits
consumers as a whole whether they use wireless phones or not. That
is, businesses who communicate using wireless technology work more
efficiently and ultimately pass on lower costs and higher quality to
consumers."
5
The TCA is encouraging wireless service providers to improve
technology and develop new and more efficient services. By reserving
some discretion to the towns on locating cell towers, within specific
limitations outlined by the TCA, wireless service providers are forced
to invent alternative means of providing their services. For example,
engineers have experimented with new techniques to "hide" cell
towers and antennas. These concepts include using environmentally
pleasing paints and incorporating the towers into smokestacks, water
towers, church steeples and chimneys." 6 Eventually, wireless innova-
tions may even reach so far as to make the cell tower obsolete, but with
out the regulations and control of local governments, wireless provid-
ers would not have the incentive.
V. Conclusion
Cases such as Amherst suggest that courts are willing to allow
towers despite the objections of property owners and town officials,
but the TCA is written to allow the towns some regulation if they
follow the limitations outlined in the act. Clearly, the TCA is vague and
subject to varying interpretations. The courts, however, must recognize
the traditional authority of local governments in zoning controversies
and balance this authority with the overall purpose of the TCA. The
FCC, the agency responsible for implementing and regulating the
TCA, and the courts, who oversee the enforcement of the TCA, must
remember that consumers were the intended beneficiaries of the TCA.
Consequently, in order to fulfill Congress's vision of a pro-competitive,
Loyola Consumer Law Review Volume 12, Number
pro-consumer communications market, wireless service providers and
local and state governments must work together to achieve this com-
mon goal.
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